Where the Japanese Public Stands on Revising Pacifist Constitution

Conversely, concerns about antagonizing China — which has regularly voiced its opposition to the issue — and North Korea were far lower at 25% and 16%, respectively. And while Washington has regularly pushed for a more empowered Japanese military, worries about serving America’s interests over Japan’s were comparatively limited (20%). Likewise, although the constitution was originally authored with the explicit goal of disempowering Japan’s jingoist military leaders, few Japanese cited a lack of trust in military officials as driving their views (7%).

The likelihood of revisions could hinge on the renewed fortunes of Kishida and the LDP

Kishida’s rising approval ratings alongside Japan’s suddenly surging economy and positive evaluations of the prime minister’s recent foreign policy maneuvers could create an opening to pursue constitutional reform once again. But there are also strategic reasons for a near-term delay. While Japan’s current parliament already contains the necessary two-thirds majority of pro-revision parties to potentially table a reform motion, our data shows that only a slight majority of LDP supporters (53%) are at least somewhat in favor of constitutional revision, with just 18% strongly in favor. Public support, meanwhile, falls short of a majority among those who identify with every other Japanese political party on which we collect data, including a number of parties that together constitute the pro-reform bloc.

Given these trends, our data suggests Kishida would benefit from shoring up his political capital before pushing ahead with such efforts. While the LDP fared well in recent by-elections, another full parliamentary election — this time for the Diet’s more powerful lower house — is not scheduled until 2025. But Kishida’s recent foreign policy successes have increased the likelihood of, and calls for, an early election. With security increasingly front and center after the recent G7 meeting in Hiroshima, such an election could test public appetites for constitutional revision, or at least rekindle debate over its merits.

Shifting currents in Japanese politics could also refresh the debate

A parliamentary realignment could further change the calculus around revision. The LDP currently rules in a coalition with junior partner Komeito, which holds an outsize share of parliamentary seats relative to its 4% national popularity, owing in part to an agreement between the two parties not to compete for single-seat districts. The LDP in turn benefits from outreach by the religious organization that constitutes Komeito’s base, while encouraging some supporters to vote for Komeito in nonlocal elections. Though conservative and ostensibly in favor of constitutional revision, the Bhuddist organization styles itself a “party of peace,” and has questioned the LDP’s current proposal for revising Article 9 to legitimize the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Meanwhile, just over a third of likely Komeito voters say they support revising Article 9.

However, cracks have emerged between the LDP and Komeito in recent years over defense issues, and Kishida’s renewed political fortunes — and by extension, those of the LDP — could diminish Komeito’s electoral importance. The two parties’ long-standing electoral agreement has already started to falter. Meanwhile, the star of another, more conservative pro-revision party, Ishin, has also been rising lately, further threatening Komeito’s influence. While Ishin remains in the opposition for now, its party leader says he is open to cooperating with the LDP on specific legislation. Both were recently aligned on their proposals for revising Article 9, about which Komeito and its adherents are more hesitant. A near majority of Ishin-aligned adults (49%) at least somewhat support revision, the next highest share after the LDP, while 22% are strongly in favor, the highest of any party. Yet even these proposals are believed to have been softened to appease Komeito, whose leaders have questioned their necessity altogether: While 35% of Komeito voters say they are amenable to revision, a mere 7% are strongly in favor. A reinvigorated revisionist alliance and a diminished Komeito — or one left out of a future governing coalition entirely — could mean even bolder approaches to constitutional revision and military expansion, especially as Ishin starts to challenge the LDP from the right.

Will the revisionists finally get their day?

The idea of constitutional revision has been a stalwart of Japanese political discourse for years, yet every apparent horizon for revisionists has heretofore proved false. While a parliamentary supermajority once again favors revision, public opinion remains divided. Still, the changing geopolitical landscape, and growing concerns about China especially, appear to be normalizing the idea of augmenting Japan’s military forces, whether constitutionally or through other channels.

Kishida’s political fortunes, waning until recently, now appear to be waxing on the strength of security concerns, suggesting the timing could be fortuitous to renew public debate. And yet it remains difficult to say whether Kishida has the political capital to succeed where so many others have failed. A profitable early election could change the tide, but the bar for success, as ever, remains high.

Washington and Beijing, as well as others caught up in the gravitational field of Asia-Pacific security, will be watching the proceedings closely. Beijing would do well to take note of its role in the debate: While its aggressive posturing does not seem to be resonating with those opposed to constitutional reform, it has animated those in favor of constitutionally legitimizing an expanded Japanese military.

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